Answering the free-rider by Allan, Jim
ANSWERING THE FREE-RIDER* 
Jim Allan 
University of Otago 
In the last four paragraphs of his highly polished Enquiries* 
David Hume concludes by turning his attention to the alleged 
advantages of vice and the possible responses to a sensible knave 
whose guiding policy is "[t]hat honesty is the best policy may be a 
good general rule, but is liable to many exceptions; and he ... 
conducts himself with most wisdom, who observes the general rule, 
and takes advantage of all the exceptions." 2 Hume promptly 
continues: 
I must confess that, if a man think that this reasoning much 
requires an answer, it will be a little difficult to find any which will 
to him appear satisfactory and convincing. / / his heart rebel not 
against such pernicious maxims, / / he feel no reluctance to the 
thoughts of villainy or baseness, he has indeed lost a considerable 
motive to virtue; and we may expect his practice will be answerable 
to his speculation. But in all ingenuous natures, the antipathy to 
treachery and roguery is too strong to be counter-balanced by any 
views of profit or pecuniary advantage. Inward peace of mind, 
consciousness of integrity, a satisfactory review of our own conduct; 
these are circumstances, very requisite to happiness, and will be 
cherished and cultivated by every honest man, who feels the 
importance of them. 3 
This response to the problem of the 'free-rider' is quite in 
keeping with the view that moral evaluations are essentially 
subjective and that there are no external, objective moral standards, 
nor rights or duties to be reasoned to or intuited, nor even 
epistemological best answers independent of metaphysics. It is 
compatible with an acceptance that the core motives of action are not 
reason-based; that reason merely guides choices by showing 
probable consequences; that the inclinations and propensities 
propelling people are not monolithic or homogeneous. In short, this 
response to the free-rider problem corresponds with what one would 
* The bulk of this article formed a small part of the author's doctoral thesis on 
David Hume and moral scepticism. Special gratitude is owed to Mark Fisher. 
1 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning 
th e Principles of Morals (ed L A Selby-Biggc, 3rd edn, revised by P H Nidditch), 
Oxford University Press, 1962 (hereafter 'Enquiries'). 
2 Enquiries, pp. 282-3 (italics in original). 
3 Ibid, (all italics mine). 
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expect of a moral sceptic like Hume 4 who is perhaps 
characteristically optimistic about human nature, at least as regards 
the bulk of mankind. 
In this paper I would like to consider Hume's response to the 
free-rider in greater detail. I will do this as one who concurs in 
Hume's second-order moral scepticism. Consequently my focus will 
not be moral scepticism per se but rather the task of seeing what, if 
any, answer the sceptic can give to the sensible knave who inclines 
towards free-riding. 
To start it must be said that Hume's own discussion of the free-
rider problem is somewhat unsatisfactory. The problem is not that 
his moral theory fails to make free-riding impossible or to prevent 
it—no theory has been able to eliminate free-riding. Rather one 
weakness is Hume's tendency to pose a false dichotomy: 5 'Should I, 
in balancing the account, opt for justice, with its occasional 
disutilities and impositions, or for no system of justice at all'? But it 
is evident these are not the only two choices. Scattered, and even 
widespread and regular, violations of a system of justice will not 
bring it down anymore than occasional optings for "simple acts of 
justice" 6 which conflict with the rules. We see all around us what a 
sturdy resilience has justice. Additionally, the free-rider (as distinct 
from the revolutionary or terrorist) does not want the system of 
justice to collapse. Usually what he wants is widespread compliance 
by others making his 'prudential compliance where necessary but 
avoidance where profitable' strategy that much more advantageous. 
Hume seems at times to gloss over the crucial difference between an 
interest in having a system, convention or framework in place and an 
interest in always abiding by its rigours. 
So having ruled out the reply that, 'being just is better than 
having no system at all' we can look more closely at the oft laboured 
task of attempting to make the case that every individual is always 
better off by being just. Then we can ask whether a sceptical moral 
theory like Hume's is open to the charge that it cannot whole-
heartedly condemn the free-rider. 
4 This is my reading of Hume in both the Enquiries and A Treatise of Human 
Nature (cd L A Sclby-Biggc, 2nd cdn, revised by P H Nidditch), Oxford University 
Press, 1978 (hereafter 'Treatise'). 1 also draw on a wide range of others' views 
including those of Barry Stroud, Hume, Routlcdgc, 1977 (hereafter 'Stroud'); J L 
Mackic, Hume's Moral Theory, Routledgc, 1980 (hereafter 'Mackic'); and Gerald 
Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, Clarendon Press, 1986 
(hereafter 'Postema'). 
5 Stroud makes a similar point about Hume at pp. 205, 208,210 and 214. Vide too 
Postema, pp. 137-8. Hume's tendency to pose an all-or-nothing choice is evident in 
his discussion of justice in Treatise, III ii 2, in particular pp. 497-498. 
6 Treatise, p. 497. 
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Postema argues 7 that the question Hume must answer is not a) 
What now motivates most people to comply with rules of justice? but 
rather b) "Is it rational for an individual to participate in the 
formation of the practice of justice and is it rational for such a person 
also to comply with the rules of the practice thus established?" 8. I 
agree with Postema about a); however I do not agree that Hume's 
task is to make a universal case for the rationality of compliance 
with justice if by 'rational' is meant 'reason-based motives in favour 
of. Such an undertaking would fundamentally undermine Hume's 
non-reason-based theory of motivation and his whole case that 
morality is not based on reason. Of course if 'rational' is to mean 
something like 'desirable' or 'appropriate' then Postema's question is 
fine but vague. (Hume himself sanctions a loose, non-literal use of 
the term 'reason'—"an improper sense" 9—to correspond to popular 
usage and stand for calm, impartial sentiments.) Hence the question 
I think Hume tries to answer in the affirmative is c) Is it always in 
every individual's self-interest to comply with the rules of justice? 
Hume's basic strategy is to provide experience-based prudential 
arguments against free-riding although, as Stroud n o t e s , 1 0 he 
occasionally lapses into rhetoric reminiscent of Plato and what I 
might call gold versus bronze types of satisfactions. 1 1 But I put such 
rhetorical passages down to exuberance and Hume's literary skills 
and turn to Hume's basic strategy. 
Here Hume does not labour too hard 1 2 . His arguments are fairly 
straightforward. Firstly, if one is caught cheating she will be worse 
off (even long-term) than had she always been honest. Secondly, 
successful free-riding is difficult. This is also presented in the 
obverse form that the easiest course is to act justly (in which form it 
may carry extra psychological insight). Then finally, recognising 
that not each single act of justice always leads to gain for any 
particular agent, Hume points to the value of general ru les 1 3 and sets 
up the false dichotomy I have rejected above . 1 4 
7 Postema, p 135, fn 38. 
8 Ibid, (italics mine). 
9 Treatise, p 536. Vide too Treatise, pp 417,437, 583. 
10 V/We Stroud, p. 215. 
11 Vide Enquiries, pp. 283-284. 
1 2 Postema discusses Hume's arguments from pp. 137-143. Hume's arguments in 
the Enquiries occur just before and after the quotation which began this paper. Sec 
fn. 3 above. His discussion of justice and the need to follow rules is at Treatise, III 
ii 2. 
1 1 Vide Treatise, p. 497, 532, 551 and Enquiries, p. 304 inter alia. Hume's version 
of rule-utility is doubtlessly strict. He seems to condone violations only where the 
rules themselves threaten society. (Vide Postema, pp. 105-107). Cf. fn. 17 infra. 
1 4 Vide p. 2 supra. 
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The first two arguments are powerful lessons drawn from 
experience. But as Hume saw they do not hold in all situations, is 
Not everyone is caught. Some few are intelligent enough to pick 
their opportunities well. What is essential is merely to make others 
believe one is a respecter-of-justice, a keeper-of-promises, an honest 
person, as Stroud points out . 1 6 Nor does Hume's version of the third 
argument work. 
John Mackie proposes 1 7 a more sophisticated version. He argues 
that debates in moral philosophy frequently focus misleadingly on 
acts. This might be the case with the free-rider dilemma (which is of 
course one aspect of the right versus good or well-being contest). To 
attempt to dissuade the potential free-rider—or more accurately all 
potential free-riders—by offering him self-interested, experienced-
based generalisations of outcome which favour the 'justice option' is 
impossible on an act-by-act basis. Nor does Hume's all-or-nothing 
rule-utility help once it is acknowledged that the free-rider will not 
destroy the system. But if attention were shifted away from acts-in-
isolation to practices or dispositions the case against free-riding 
would be stronger. The nub of Mackie's case is that for human 
beings, operating in the uncertain swirl of other human beings all 
themselves similarly operating, some choices are impracticable. 
Some options are simply not 'live' options. This is because 
consequences become impossible to assess perfectly and even where 
they can be guessed at, it may well be unachievable to organise 
matters appropriately. Perhaps one must choose some practice, some 
disposition to act in a particular way, and each such choice 
necessarily (given human limitations) includes some particular acts 
that would not be chosen on their own. 1 8 This is a world in which 
'5 And the larger and more complex a society grows the less obvious to all become 
the tasks mandated by reciprocity. In short, it is easier to cheat in a large, modern, 
complex society. Additionally, in such societies can be found the triad or mafia boss 
- not exactly a free-rider because he operates by force and fear, not deception, and 
not exactly a revolutionary or terrorist because he docs not want the existing system 
of justice to collapse. I prefer to think of all similar mafiosa as 'fear-riders' rather 
than 'free-riders' but the following discussion is generally applicable to these fear-
riders as well. 
1 6 Vide Stroud, p. 206. Vide too Postema, p. 136. 
1 7 Vide Mackic, pp. 90-93. The following paragraph is my liberal interpretation of 
Mackie. 
• 8 Mackie's own example is of the election campaign in which electing candidate X 
has more utility than electing any of the others, indeed more utility than if all X's 
supporters chose to do something other than vote. Now the best result would be a 
victory by X by one vote, with all the rest of X's supporters out increasing utility in 
some other way. This, though, is not possible to arrange and so X's supporters must 
spend their time voting. The optimal result is unattainable. Vide Mackie, pp. 91-92. 
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the 'live' options are practices or dispositions—not particular acts. 
And so the prospective free-rider: 
may reasonably, out of prudent self-interest, adopt a 
regular practice and cultivate a disposition in 
oneself, or, again, enter into and try to maintain an 
interpersonal general practice with its associated 
dispositions, because the practice as a whole (in 
either case) is advantageous to oneself, although 
some of the separate acts which constitute it (either 
one's own or those of other agents) will be against 
one's interest. 1 9 
This argument, that certain acts which cannot be seen as good 
even in the long, long-term may nevertheless be seen as inexorable 
side-effects of a good, desirable practice or disposition, improves 
upon Hume's prudential case. By not omitting to consider what is 
and is not possible for creatures such as humans it cleverly makes 
more coherent how a general system of justice, where some acts in 
accordance with that system, but viewed in isolation, are actually 
harmful and unjust, can nevertheless be for the good. 
I fear, however, that Mackie also fails to answer the free-rider. 
He simply does not manage to "show [conclusive] reasons why [each 
and every free-rider] should always act justly or honestly, even when 
[her] action, considered on its own, is harmful." 2 0 He seems to move 
too cheerfully and optimistically from the conclusion that a scheme 
of justice most certainly can be good even though it unfortunately, 
and due to human variables necessarily, has bad particular 
consequences to the further conclusion that any free-rider would, for 
reasons of self-interest, apply this to her own case and choose justice. 
But to do this is to conflate the issue of whether society will be better 
off with inflexible rules with the free-rider's calculation of whether to 
follow justice unswervingly. The two questions need to be evaluated 
from different vantages. 2 1 In reality Mackie's case to the potential 
free-rider boils down to an assertion that the only viable options for 
people are all-or-nothing dispositions (which is different from 
claiming that the only viable justicial systems contain all-or-nothing 
rules). This psychological assertion, though, seems to me to be false. 
The mind is more compartmentalized than Mackie makes out 2 2 ; the 
1 9 Mackie, p. 93. 
2 0 Ibid., p. 86. 
2 1 It seems to me that Postema (vide pp. 134-143) may also conflate the two issues. 
2 2 This criticism also undermines Postema's formulation (pp. 140-142) of Hume's 
case that any knave's strategy, to be successful, must not leave him or her cut off 
from the community. Free-riding need not be a 'systematic' pursuit. As Hume 
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devout Catholic can choose to have an abortion or, with fewer if any 
qualms, to use contraception; the environmentalist can deliberately 
litter, enjoy air-conditioning and drive hours each day to and from 
work; the convicted thief can be a loving father and dependable 
friend; and there are free-riders who can and do attempt to follow 
justice when it is in their interests but not otherwise. It may for many 
be 'wise' to choose in terms of a disposition but for some at least raw 
self-interest—even after accounting for the difficulty of stepping in 
and out of a practice and the costs of overcoming certain qualms— 
must surely point towards free-riding. 
Must we conclude then that the task of convincing each and 
every individual that his self-interest (even in the broader sense in 
which self-interest is taken to be furthered when an agent happens to 
get happiness by, say, making some sacrifice for his lover) points 
him towards justice on all occasions is an impossible task? For the 
moral sceptic the answer quite simply is yes. Any moral theory must 
admit that all systems of justice have their free-riders. For the moral 
sceptic, there is the further admission that on her principles there is 
no way to answer some free-riders. To make that all-inclusive 
answer requires some form of moral objectivism—the reply that 
certain values and thus behaviours simply are right and mandated 
whatever the surrounding circumstances or costs. Without an 
objective foundation for obligation 2 3 there will always be occasional 
circumstances (given a particular type of person) in which self-
interest and self-referential benevolence and even the instinctive 
desire for communal interaction are not convincingly re-directed 
towards justice. 
If the task of convincing each and every person of the advantages 
of justice be hopeless for the moral sceptic does it further follow that 
that same moral sceptic cannot condemn the free-rider? Certainly 
not! Hume's very strong attachment to justice is not weakened 
despite or by his inability to answer each and every knave . 2 4 To see 
why one need only recall that Hume's is a non-reason-based theory 
of action. Reason cannot 'convince' us how to act; it can merely 
guide us by illuminating probable causal consequences. But 
underlying such consequences are particular desires, propensities and 
inclinations and these vary between individuals. Certain people with 
himself comments in Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (ed. Eugene Miller), 
Liberty Classics, 1985, "ITJhe heart of man is made to reconcile contradictions." 
('Of the Parties of Great Britain', p. 71) And again, "But what is man but a heap of 
contradictions." ('Of Polygamy and Divorces', p. 188). 
2 3 That foundation for obligation could be provided by any type of moral realism or 
perhaps even by a social contract analysis. (Vide, for example, Postema, pp. 53-54). 
Hume, in my view, rejects all these. 
2 4 Pace Postema, p. 138. 
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certain inclinations will find the consequences, including the obvious 
risks, of free-riding quite acceptable, even attractive.2-4* What the 
Humean can condemn 2 6 then are these core inclinations. Their bad 
consequences make them 'inappropriate' and 'undermining' from a 
social perspective (and as Hume recognises they are 'risky' and more 
often than not 'socially isolating' from the free-rider's perspective). 
None of this, though, need alter those inclinations and thus 
'convince' potential free-riders not to free-ride. Any appeal to self-
interest depends in part on the agent's interests or passions. So the 
Humean can condemn the free-rider but only from a certain vantage, 
the vantage of him who has 'appropriate' inclinations. And this is 
what Hume is getting at in the passage cited at the start of this 
paper. 2 7 
Finally, to accept that there are no arguments that can 'convince' 
all potential free-riders to desist, that no appeal to self-interest 
universally points to steadfast compliance with justice, is no more 
problematic than an inability ' rationally' 2 8 to dissuade all potential 
revolutionaries, terrorists or traitors. In all such extreme cases a 
society must rely on the efficacy of legal sanctions, of the general 
standards which have become generally known and settled and which 
provide an enforceable external criteria. The problem of the free-
2 ^ Of course to qualify as free-riders such people will also have to be those who arc 
not moved to justice by benevolence, loyalty, generosity, public spirit, etc. 
2 6 By 'condemn' I mean 'assign blame for'. Such Humean blame would be a 
method of social dissuasion. Assigning blame for having socially undesirable 
inclinations would promote deterrence and further moral education by helping to 
repress and prevent these inclinations in future. On occasion the prospect of such 
blame might even be a motive contributing towards the re-direction of individuals' 
existing, undesirable inclinations. But Humean blame would not necessarily 
connote an acceptance of free-will and the possibility of choosing one's core 
inclinations, which possibility Hume himself, at least in those contemplative 
moments of philosophical reflection in his study, would have great difficulty 
accepting. 
This is not to say that I accept the Humean compatibilist solution to the question 
of the possibility of free-will existing. I do not. My view is that coherent or 
incoherent, more is generally meant by free-will than the voluntariness or freedom 
from external compulsion which Hume seems to think it signifies. Still, I am 
following Hume when I note the difficulty in making a case against determinism. 
To respond by accepting the case for determinism but pointing out that despite such 
reasoning humans continue to feel, believe and behave as though they had free-will 
would be. in my opinion, typically within the Humean spirit. Any in-depth 
discussion of determinism is far beyond the purview of this paper. Here, it is 
enough to note that Humean condemnation is in terms of the consequences to 
society. 
2 7 Videfn. 3 supra. 
2 8 I.e., in terms of likely consequences. One might also attempt to manipulate and 
indoctrinate people with different sentiments and preferences. 
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rider graphically illustrates the need for established standards and 
enforceable sanctions which are positive and in that sense objective 
and mind-independent. Hume was well aware of the need for such 
legal standards. To those individuals whose hearts rebel not at the 
thought of villainy or baseness there is no other response the moral 
sceptic can give. She, like Hume, must ultimately rely on successful 
free-riding proving too difficult for most so inclined. 
